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UNITED STATES v. McOMBER:
A CHALLENGE TO STATE COURTS
ON COUNSELLESS WAIVERS
The individual criminal suspect undergoing interrogation is often
confronted with the police power of the state in circumstances
which he finds confusing and frightening. The sixth amendment
to the United States Constitution purports to protect the suspect
by guaranteeing his right to the assistance of counsel.' This safe-
guard can be elusive if police investigators can too easily seduce
the suspect into waiving his right to the presence of counsel.
The range of protections relating to the right of an accused to
the presence of counsel during a police interrogation can be thought
of as spanning a continuum. At one extreme would be a rule re-
quiring no warning at all of the right to counsel. A move from
this position toward greater protection was Miranda v. Arizona,2
requiring that the police advise the suspect of the right to the
presence of counsel in advance of the interrogation.3 A further
step would be to make notification of counsel a prerequisite to ques-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Id. at 474.
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tioning.4 At the other end of the spectrum there would be a com-
plete bar to questioning of the accused without the actual presence
of counsel, notwithstanding counsel's notification and opportunity
to be present.
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has sanctioned
numerous limitations on the right to counsel.5 The Court has re-
cently held that Miranda does not apply to volunteered statements,
even when questioning is done behind closed doors at the police
station.6 The Supreme Court has also allowed statements taken
in violation of the requirements of Miranda to be used for impeach-
ment.
7
Some state courts, however, have refused to follow this retreat
from the policies of Miranda, preferring instead to use state consti-
tutions and statutes to strengthen the protection given an accused.
8
As the California Supreme Court noted in People v. Disbrow,9 these
states can now find support in the decisions of another separate
jurisdiction, the military.10 In April 1976, the United States Court
of Military Appeals, the highest military appellate court, decided
United States v. McOmber." This Comment discusses this inde-
pendent approach to the problem of defining and limiting waiver
of counsel. The first part of this Comment analyzes McOmber,
which made notification of counsel a precondition for a valid waiver
of counsel's presence during interrogation. The Comment then con-
siders the present effectiveness of Miranda in the civilian courts
and examines whether state courts using state law could strengthen
the Miranda protection by following the example of McOmber.
4. For a discussion of New York's approach, see text accompanying
notes 123-31 infra.
5. E.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433 (1974).
6. Oregon v. Mathiason, 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977).
7. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971).
8. The California Supreme Court rejected the rule of Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), and held that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in the California Constitution precludes prosecution use for impeach-
ment of statements taken in violation of the Miranda requirements. People
v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368
(1976). See also State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971);
Butler v. State, 493 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. 1973). Pennsylvania has explicitly
adopted Miranda as state law. Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52, 284 A.2d
700 (1971).
9. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
10. Id. at 110, 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368, setting forth the
example of the United States Court of Military Appeals, which rejected
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), on statutory grounds. United
States v. Jordan, 20 C.M.A. 614, 44 C.M.R. 44 (1971).
11. 24 C.M.A. 207, 51 C.M.R. 452 (1976).
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DEVELOPMENT OF A PER SE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN
MILITARY COURTS: United States v. McOmber
Pre-McOmber
In interpreting the sixth amendment, the Miranda Court required
specific warnings of certain rights before custodial interrogation.
12
One such right is the presence of counsel during the interrogation.
1 3
In the absence of counsel, a suspect may not be interviewed without
first making a knowing and voluntary waiver of this right.'
4
The military defendant's rights derive from both constitutional
and statutory sources. First, United States v. Tempia
5 held that
the sixth amendment and Miranda govern military proceedings. In
applying Miranda, the military courts generally require nothing
more than civilian courts: 1 6 If the government has given the
Miranda warnings, and there has been no "dirty pool"'
17 to eliminate
voluntariness, the suspect is competent to waive the presence of
counsel at an interrogation.'
8
In addition to Miranda, two sources, the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice (U.C.M.J.) 19 and the Manual for Courts-Martial
(M.C.M.),20 govern military procedure. Although military courts
interpret these sources independently of civilian case law,
2 ' tradi-
12. 384 U.S. at 479.
13. Id. at 474.
14. Id. at 475.
15. 16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967). See also United States v. Woods,
22 C.M.A. 369, 47 C.M.R. 124 (1973); United States v. Jordan, 20 C.M.A. 614,
44 C.M.R. 44 (1971).
16. United States v. Clark, 22 C.M.A. 570, 48 C.M.R. 77 (1973).
17. United States v. Flack, 20 C.M.A. 201, 205, 43 C.M.R. 41, 45 (1970),
quoting United States v. DeLoy, 421 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1970). DeLoy,
discussed at text accompanying notes 82-89 infra, held statements obtained
in the absence of counsel are inadmissible only when the government had
elicited, solicited, or suggested a statement in an unfair manner.
18. United States v. Gaines, 21 C.M.A. 236, 45 C.M.R. 10 (1972).
19. 11 U.S.C. §§ 801-950 (1970). Section 831, which lists the rights of
a suspect in criminal proceedings, does not specifically mention the right
to counsel; however, paragraph (d) forbids the use of any statement ob-
tained through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful induce-
ment.
20. THE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited
as M.C.M.] was promulgated by Exec. Order No. 11476, 34 Fed. Reg. 10502
(1969), pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1970).
21. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137,
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tionally their decisions closely parallel civilian rulings based upon
Miranda.
The M.C.M. requires that counsel deal with a suspect only through
the suspect's attorney.22 However, prior to McOmber, admissions
made in interrogations outside the attorney's presence and without
notification to the attorney were admissible. The rationale of these
cases was that the suspect's knowing and voluntary waiver nulli-
fied any error.23 As a result, military appellate courts became en-
meshed in a wearisome case-by-case review of the waiver's volun-
tariness. 24 In 1974, the Army Court of Military Review, an inter-
mediate appellate court, proclaimed that the "law is fixed that an
accused who has been provided counsel may give a competent
waiver." 25 However, the court added that the rule was tolerable
only as long as interrogations outside the presence of counsel re-
mained an infrequent police practice.26 The court suggested that
if that practice became more widespread, it would seriously consider
replacing case-by-case reviews of the voluntariness of waiver of
counsel with a per se exclusionary rule.27 The court especially
noted the per se New York rule which invalidates any waiver given
without notification to counsel.
28
McOmber
In the 1976 decision of United States v. McOmber, the Court of
Military Appeals not only considered but also adopted a per se ex-
clusionary rule.29 Airman James T. McOmber asserted his right to
counsel at initial questioning regarding the theft of a tape deck.
140 (1953) (military law is a jurisprudence existing separately and apart
from the civilian judiciary).
22. M.C.M, supra note 20, at para. 44 (h).
23. United States v. Scott, 22 C.M.A. 500, 47 C.M.R. 917 (1973); United
States v. Clayborne, 22 C.M.A. 387, 47 C.M.R. 239 (1973); United States v.
Johnson, 20 C.M.A. 320, 43 C.M.R. 160 (1971); United States v. Flack, 20
C.M.A. 201, 43 C.M.R. 41 (1970); United States v. Estep, 19 C.M.A. 201, 41
C.M.R. 201 (1970).
24. United States v. Dohle, 24 C.M.A. 34, 51 C.M.R. 84 (1975); United
States v. Brown, 48 C.M.R. 181 (A.C.M.R. 1973); United States v. Howard,
18 C.M.A. 252, 39 C.M.R. 252 (1969).
25. United States v. Robinson, 49 C.M.R. 183, 186 (A.C.M.R. 1974).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id., citing People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.
2d 663 (1968). The New York per se exclusionary rule is discussed at text
accompanying notes 123-31 infra.
29. In 1969, the Court of Military Appeals had specifically rejected the
New York rule which prohibits any waiver made outside the presence of
counsel. United States v. Robinson, 49 C.M.R. 183 (A.C.M.R. 1974). See
also United States v. Goldman, 18 C.M.A. 389, 40 C.M.R. 101 (1969).
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The investigators immediately terminated the interrogation, sup-
plying McOmber with the name and address of a defense counsel.
30
Two months later, the investigators again interviewed McOmber.
The second interview related to nine larceny offenses, including
the same tape deck charge. The appointed counsel who now repre-
sented McOmber was not present at the questioning. The investi-
gators admitted they had failed to notify McOmber's attorney
before the second interview. Adequate warnings of the right to
counsel preceded both interrogations. On the second occasion, how-
ever, McOmber waived those rights, giving an incriminating state-
ment which was later admitted at his trial for larceny of the tape
deck.
At trial and on appeal, the defendant argued that the use of this
statement violated both his constitutional and statutory 1 rights to
counsel. The government, while admitting technical violations of
the M.C.M., 32 contended that such errors were not prejudicial when
accompanied by the suspect's waiver.38
Chief Judge Fletcher of the United States Court of Military
Appeals insisted that allowing a defendant to waive the presence
of counsel would encourage violations of the right to counsel. He
ruled that once an investigator becomes aware that the suspect has
an attorney, further questioning may not take place without afford-
ing that attorney a reasonable opportunity to be present at the in-
terrogation.3 4 If the investigator does not notify counsel, any state-
ment obtained will be inadmissible under the U.C.M.J. 35 The mili-
tary courts thus adopted a per se exclusionary rule intended to pro-
tect the suspect's right to counsel by eliminating case-by-case
reviews of voluntariness. McOmber explicitly limited its holding
to statutory grounds, 30 although Chief Judge Fletcher referred to
30. 24 C.M.A. at 208, 51 C.M.R. at 453.
31. 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1970) provides statutory protection from compulsory
self-incrimination and prohibits the use of any statement obtained through
coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement.
32. M.C.M., supra note 20, at para. 44 (h).
33. United States v. Johnson, 20 C.M.A. 320, 43 C.M.R. 160 (1971); United
States v. Flack, 20 C.M.A. 201, 43 C.M.R. 41 (1970); United States v. Estep,
19 C.M.A. 201, 41 C.M.R. 201 (1970).
34. 24 C.M.A. at 209, 51 C.M.R. at 454.
35. 10 U.S.C. § 831(d) (1970).
36. 24 C.M.A. at 208, 51 C.M.R. at 453.
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Miranda and other civilian cases interpreting the sixth amend-
ment.
37
The specific holding in McOmber requires merely notification of
counsel and a reasonable opportunity for the attorney to be present
during the interrogation. 38 In its reasoning, however, the court evi-
denced a broader concern for the theoretical question of whether
there can be any effective waiver of counsel without the actual
presence of counsel.3 0  Although in practice military investigators
interpret notification of counsel to include an affirmative statement
by the suspect's attorney permitting the questioning, the extent to
which actual waiver by counsel is a necessary part of notification
remains an unresolved issue.
CIVILIAN CASES-THE NoRIVI
Miranda, Massiah v. United States,40 and the ABA Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility 4' could provide justification for requiring
the presence of counsel at the interrogation. However, most civilian
courts-state and federal-reject this view and hold that a defend-
ant is competent to waive the presence of his attorney.42 By thus
refusing to extend the right to the presence of counsel, the federal
courts have left to the states the task of providing further protection
for the right to counsel.
43
Miranda
Miranda is subject to varying interpretations. 44  The Miranda
Court was obviously concerned for the suspect confronted with the
37. Chief Judge Fletcher cited Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Coughlan v. United States,
391 F.2d (9th Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 870 (1968).
38. 24 C.M.A. at 209, 51 C.M.R. at 454.
39. Id.
40. 377 U.S. 201 (1964), discussed in text accompanying notes 51-67 infra.
41. See text accompanying notes 68-77 inIra.
42. Dillon v. United States, 391 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1968); Hart v. State,
484 P.2d 1334 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
43. Moore v. Wolff, 495 F.2d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1974); Dillon v. United
States, 391 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1968).
44. Compare the various opinions in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96
(1975). Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, insisted "clearly the
Court in Miranda imposed no such requirement" of an attorney's presence
for a valid waiver. Id. at 104 n.10. Justice Brennan's dissent, on the
contrary, felt that Miranda indeed suggests that once a request for coun-
sel has been made, questioning must be stopped until counsel is present.
Id. at 117. In this connection, consider dicta in Mathies v. United States,
374 F.2d 312, 316 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1967) that "[t]he prospective applica-
tion of Miranda ... plainly will require that such interviews can be con-
1210
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atmosphere of custodial interrogation. 45 The Supreme Court ob-
served that if "the individual states that he wants an attorney, the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present."46 The Court
thus appeared to clearly prohibit counselless interrogation. Such
a prohibition would effectively ensure repeated questioning would
not overbear the suspect's will.
47
In addition, however, the Miranda ruling imposed a "heavy
burden" upon the government if the interrogation proceeds without
the presence of an attorney.48 The Court defined this "burden"
as requiring proof that the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his right to counsel.49 But because this discussion of the
burden would have been superfluous if Miranda had imposed a flat
ban on questioning outside of the presence of counsel, the majority
of courts ignores the seemingly broad language of Miranda and does
admit statements made at counselless interrogations if the govern-
ment meets its burden of showing a knowing and voluntary waiver
of counsel.5 0
Massiah
Deprived of recourse to Miranda, defendants often invoke Mas-
siah51 to attack the validity of waivers outside the presence of
counsel.52 However, Massiah involved more than the bare absence
of the suspect's attorney during interrogation. Although Massiah
ducted only after counsel has been given an opportunity to be present."
It is interesting to note that this opinion was written by now Chief Justice
Burger.
45. The Court noted that the "circumstances surrounding in-custody in-
terrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will." 384 U.S. at 469.
46. Id. at 474.
47. Id. at 466.
48. Id. at 475.
49. Id. at 475, citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964).
50. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 n.10 (1975); Moore v. Wolff,
495 F.2d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1974); Constantine v. People, 495 P.2d 208 (Colo.
1972).
51. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
52. Judge Godbard commented in United States v. Anderson, 523 F.2d
1192, 1195 (5th Cir. 1975), that Massiah is an expression of a "broad concern,
which is to protect an indicted defendant who has counsel from erosion of
the benefits of his sixth amendment right to counsel." For a military case
unsuccessfully invoking Massiah, see United States v. Flack, 20 C.M.A. 201,
43 C.M.R. 41 (1970).
had an attorney, he was free on bail when he had an incriminating
conversation in a co-defendant's bugged automobile. 53 Massiah did
not realize that investigators were listening to the conversation.
This surreptitious behavior, the Court held, deprived Massiah of the
knowledge of the interrogation essential to a valid waiver of the
presence of counsel.5
4
The confusion surrounding Massiah arises from the Supreme
Court's cryptic decision in McLeod v. Ohio.5" After his arrest,
McLeod made an oral confession during the search for the murder
weapon. He was not then represented by counsel. The trial court
admitted the deputy sheriff's testimony reporting the confession."6
The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a de-
batable constitutional issue.57 The United States Supreme Court
vacated the original judgment and remanded it for consideration
in light of Massiah.5 On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court
distinguished Massiah on the grounds that McLeod involved no sur-
reptitious government acts and that the suspect had never re-
quested an attorney.59 Massiah had made his incriminating state-
ment after the appointment of counsel. In contrast, McLeod did
not yet have an attorney.60
On a second appeal, the United States Supreme Court disposed
of the case tersely--"Reversed. Massiah."61 One interpretation of
the Court's reversal limits its application to cases in which the
police never inform the suspect of the right to counsel. 62 A valid
waiver of counsel requires that the suspect know of the right.Y3
Thus, if the only similarity between Massiah and McLeod is the
absence of knowledge at the time of the supposed waiver, neither
case will apply to the suspect who knows of the right to counsel
and who has exercised that right. But, if the similarity between
53. 377 U.S. at 203.
54. Id. at 206.
55. 381 U.S. 356 (1965).
56. The facts are given in the second Ohio Supreme Court decision, State
v. McLeod, 1 Ohio St. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 349 (1964).
57. State v. McLeod, 173 Ohio St. 520, 184 N.E.2d 101 (1964).
58. McLeod v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 582 (1964).
59. State v. McLeod, 1 Ohio St. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 349 (1964).
60. The McLeod series of cases runs from 1962 until 1965, all pre-Mir-
anda. Thus, the standards of Escobedo and Massiah defined the right to
counsel and there was no requirement that the police offer counsel to Mc-
Leod.
61. McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356 (1965).
62. The dissent in State v. McLeod assumed the deputy sheriff never ad-
vised the suspect of the right to counsel. 1 Ohio St. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d
349, 353 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
63. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
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Massiah and McLeod lies instead in the absence of counsel, Mc-
Leod extends Massiah to exclude any counselless statement or
waiver. This exclusion would apply whether the absence of coun-
sel is the result of total absence from the case or a mere lack of
notification.64 The argument for this extension, however, has
rarely been successful. Courts prefer to limit the interpretations
of both Massiah and McLeod.65
In addition to allowing waivers without the actual presence of
counsel, most civilian courts permit waiver even without notifica-
tion to counsel. While admitting that "the better, fairer and safer
practice is to afford the defendant's attorney reasonable oppor-
tunity to be present," United States v. Coughlan66 allowed the de-
fendant to waive his right to counsel without notice to his attorney.
The civilian courts have generally held that neither Miranda nor
Massiah requires notice of the interrogation to the suspect's attor-
ney.67
Code of Professional Responsibility
The general rule that the police need not notify the suspect's
attorney in advance of the interrogation is subject to a possible ex-
ception found in the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. Dis-
ciplinary Rule 7-104 states that an attorney may communicate with
an adverse party only through that party's attorney. 68 Although the
Code applies only to attorneys, a minority of courts refuses to dis-
tinguish between the attorney who engages in prohibited question-
ing and the attorney who merely uses the results of such question-
64. United States v. Curham, 475 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1972); O'Connor v. New Jersey, 405
F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1969).
65. United States v. Crook, 502 F.2d 1378 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1123 (1975). But see United States ex rel. Chabonian v. Liek, 366
F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
66. 391 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 870 (1968).
67. E.g., United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1968); Cough-
lan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 870
(1968).
68. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 7-104:
(A) During the course of his represenation of a client a lawyer
shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject
of the representation with a party he knows to be represented
by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of
the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by
law to do so,
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ing by a non-attorney. 69 In United States v. Thomas,70 for instance,
the Tenth Circuit held the admission of a statement obtained in
the absence of the suspect's attorney was improper."1 The court
insisted that an attorney may not offer in evidence any statement
taken by a police investigator if that investigator had not given
the suspect's attorney an opportunity to be present.
7 2
The Second Circuit considered this application of the Code in
United States v. Massiah73 and rejected the contention that govern-
ment investigators must refrain from any contact with a suspect
in the absence of his attorney.74 The overwhelming majority of
courts agree with the Second Circuit that statements obtained in
supposed violation of the Code are not excludable."6 The courts
find no constitutional issue"6 and refuse to exercise their super-
visory authority to enforce the standards of ethics.
1
These defense arguments that Miranda, Massiah, and the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility preclude waiver without the
presence of counsel are generally rejected by most state and federal
courts. Instead of developing their own standards, state courts have
generally followed the federal lead requiring only that the waiver of
counsel be both knowing and voluntary.78  The state courts have
69. Allowing a prosecutor to use statements he could not personally ob-
tain encourages prosecutors to intentionally overlook dubious police prac-
tices. See generally Broader, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith
and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483 (1962).
70. 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973).
71. Id. at 112.
72. Id.
73. 307 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962).
74. Id. at 66. The majority opinion in the Supreme Court did not deal
with this issue. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Justice White's dissent noted the pur-
pose of the Code in protecting the suspect from the supposed imbalance of
legal skills and acumen between the lay suspect and the attorney, without
considering the possibly higher investigatory acumen of the professional
police investigator. Id. at 211 (White, J., dissenting).
75. E.g., United States v. Crook, 502 F.2d 1378, 1381 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975); United States v. Vasquez, 476 F.2d 730 (5th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1352 (7th Cir. 1972);
State v. Yatman, 320 So. 2d 401 (Fla. App. 1975); State v. McConnell, 529
S.W.2d 185 (Mo. App. 1975).
76. Moore v. Wolff, 495 F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1974). See also United States
v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973).
77. United States v. Crook, 502 F.2d 1378, 1381 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1123 (1975), holding that the supervisory powers may not be
used to "disregard the congressional mandate of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (a)." The
court was referring to the Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of
1968, Pub. I No. 90-351, Tit. II, § 701, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968), which pro-
vided that the trial judge is to determine voluntariness and hence admis-
sibility. See also Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E. 2d 138 (1972).
78. See, e.g., Moore v. Wolff, 495 F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1974).
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been content with the presumption that the formalities of the
Miranda warnings assure a knowing waiver." That this pre-
sumption is incorrect is evident in the cases involving suspects who
make oral admissions, yet refuse to sign written waivers of their
right to counsel.80 These suspects do not have an adequate under-
standing of waiver or of the consequences of their acts. Their clear
intention is to preserve their rights. Yet the courts continually
hold this a valid waiver of the -right to counsel.8 '
The second issue in the determination of a waiver is voluntari-
ness.8 2 The courts presume that voluntariness, like knowledge,
results from the receipt of the Miranda warnings,8 3 provided that
the government has not committed acts of "dirty pool."8 4 Dirty
pool is narrowly limited to surreptitious interrogations, 5 police
79. United States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d 891, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1973), comment-
ing that to require anything more would be "alien to the duties and the
training of policemen."
Problems of knowledgeability arise also in considering waivers given by
mental incompetents. Here, most courts avoid any definite rules, preferring
to analyze whether each particular defendant was capable of understanding
his situation. See, e.g., Elrod v. State, 281 Ala. 331, 202 So. 2d 539 (1967);
Schade v. State, 512 P. 2d 909 (Alaska 1973); People v. Tipton, 48 Cal. 2d
389, 309 P.2d 813, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 846 (1957).
Many of the cases refusing to admit post-waiver statements involved
other factors such as the use of drugs, length of interrogation, or age. For
cases considering drug use, see Logner v. North Carolina, 260 F. Supp. 970
(M.D. N.C. 1966); New Mexico v. Ortiz, 77 N.M. 316, 422 P.2d 355 (1967).
For a consideration of the length of interrogation, see Culombe v. Con-
necticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961). Age is discussed in Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S.
433 (1961), and State v. Falbo, 333 S.W.2d 279 (Mo. 1960). See also State
v. Ashdown, 5 Utah 2d 59, 62, 296 P.2d 726, 729 (1956), afj'd, 357 U.S. 426
(1958), holding that even a combination of "tender age and weak intellect"
would not alone render a confession inadmissible.
80. Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir.) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 970 (1968), noting that the defendant had
refused to sign his supposed waiver.
81. United States v. Johnson, 529 F.2d 581 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 961 (1976), where an oral waiver was combined with lack of knowl-
edge by the police that the defendant had an attorney.
82. United States v. Clark, 499 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Hodge, 487 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1973); State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 236 N.W.2d
54 (Iowa 1975).
83. United States v. Vasquez, 476 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1973).
84. United States v. DeLoy, 421 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1970). The court
refused to agree that Massiah taints any statement made by a defendant
outside the presence of his counsel, without something more which the court
characterized as governmental "dirty pool."
85. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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pressures, 80 trickery,87 and affirmative acts impeding the free exer-
cise of the suspect's will.8 8 It usually does not include the mere
failure to notify counsel.8 9
CIVILIAN CASES-EXCEPTIONS TO THE NORM
In the exceptional situation involving the juvenile accused, many
jurisdictions invalidate counselless waivers.90 The courts consider
the capabilities of the person waiving and impose a higher standard
than is required under general interpretations of Miranda and the
sixth amendment. A 1970 University of San Diego study of
waivers by children gives important insight into juvenile compe-
tency.9 1 Children of varying backgrounds, intelligence, and so-
phistication regarding police practices responded to both formal and
86. Biddy v. Diamond, 516 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1975).
87. United States v. Anderson, 523 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1975).
88. Contra, Commonwealth v. Yates, 357 A.2d 134 (Pa. 1976). In Yates,
the police affirmatively misrepresented to counsel that the suspect was
either unavailable or had already given a statement. The waiver was held
valid. It thus appears that the dirty pool must be in relation to the
suspect, not his attorney.
89. For a military case reaching the same conclusion, see United States
v. Flack, 20 C.M.A. 201, 43 C.M.R. 41 (1970). While voluntariness is gen-
erally the central concern in determining the validity of a waiver of counsel,
courts will often consider other factors. A suspect can more easily waive
an attorney appointed or retained for other charges than an attorney al-
ready involved in the subject of the interrogation. Police knowledge of the
existence of the attorney is also significant even in those jurisdictions which
generally do not allow a waiver outside the presence of counsel. People
v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965). While
this distinction may be useful in determining the reasonableness of police
conduct, it seems to have little to do with the validity of the waiver from
the suspect's point of view. A simple question about the retention or ap-
pointment of counsel, appended to the standard Miranda warnings, would
more satisfactorily indicate the propriety of the waiver.
Consider also Wilson v. United States, 398 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1968), holding
that while it is improper to interrogate a suspect who is known to have
counsel, such impropriety does not constitute reversible error.
90. There may be valid reasons to suspend certain criminal rights in a
juvenile proceeding. The purpose of the juvenile courts is rehabilitation
rather than punishment. Strict observation of technical criminal procedure
might prevent necessary disclosure. However, rather than functioning as
a kindly parent, the juvenile court may actually conduct delinquency pro-
ceedings-which are hardly distinguishable from adult criminal prosecutions.
Justice Douglas, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 559 (1971) (dis-
senting opinion), noted that when juvenile proceedings are used to "convict"
a person of a violation of a criminal statute which results in confinement
in a state institution, it is very difficult to justify distinctions based upon
a lesser need for criminal rights.
91. Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 39 (1970).
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simplified Miranda warnings.92 Of the ninety children participat-
ing in the test, eighty-six waived their rights.9 3 Later interviews
showed that most of these eighty-six misunderstood their rights at
the time of the waiver. The right least understood was the right
to presence of counsel during interrogations.
This study supports the holdings of state courts which apply a
higher standard of waiver to juveniles in light of the inadequacy
of the Miranda warnings. For example, the Indiana Supreme Court
has held that a juvenile is incompetent to waive his rights without
consulting a guardian.9 4 According to the court, "[i] t indeed seems
questionable whether any child falling under the legally defined
age of a juvenile and confronted in such a setting can be said to
be able voluntarily and willingly to waive those most important
rights."05 The court noted the inconsistency of permitting a waiver
of constitutional rights by a person legally incompetent under state
law to give blood, to marry, or to execute a binding contract.
9 6
Despite this evidence, many courts assume a child has the
capacity to make a valid waiver of the right to counsel. The
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that as long as the child is
aware of the adversary atmosphere of a custodial interrogation, his
92. The simplified version read:
You don't have to talk to me at all, now or later on, it is up to
you.
If you decide to talk to me, I can go to court and repeat what you
say, against you.
If you want a lawyer, an attorney, to help you to decide what to
do, you can have one free before and during questioning by me
now or by anyone else later on.
Do you want me to explain or repeat anything about what I have
just told you?
Remembering what I've just told you, do you want to talk to me?
Id. at 40. The test selected children from facilities for delinquents and from
community junior high schools. None of the juveniles interviewed knew
in advance that they were being tested. The interviewer attempted to
create the impression that he was investigating the juvenile's suspected in-
volvement in a crime. After the initial interview in which the children
were asked to waive their rights, a second interview was conducted to de-
termine the depth of understanding for each child.
93. Id. at 53.
94. Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 432, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972).
95. Id. at 437, 288 N.E.2d at 141.
96. Id. at 437-38, 288 N.E.2d at 142. See also State ex rel. S.H., 61 N.J.
108, 293 A.2d 181, 184 (1972) (the recitation of Miranda rights to a ten-year-
old is undoubtedly meaningless).
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waiver of counsel's presence is acceptable. 7  Another court has
held that if the child knows the difference between right and
wrong, the child can waive 8  These courts consider the totality
of circumstances, only one of which is the age or maturity of the
child. Just as with mental incompetents,9 9 most cases excluding
a juvenile's statement outside the presence of counsel have involved
other factors such as mental retardation, 10 0 lack of criminal sophis-
tication,10' or insanity.10 2 Many of those courts which do permit
counselless waivers by children impose only a minimal requirement
of notification to parents or a guardian rather than to an attor-
ney.1
0 3
AN ANALYSIS OF COUNSELLESS WAIVERS
There is now a clear split of authority about the validity of a
suspect's waiver of the right to counsel in the absence of his attor-
ney. Most civilian courts feel the Miranda warnings provide suffi-
cient protection for the suspect.10 4 However, the New York'0 and
military courts believe the suspect needs additional protection. The
choice between these two alternatives depends upon a resolution
of two issues. Does a mere Miranda warning adequately protect
the sixth amendment rights of the average defendant? If not,
would it be desirable for state courts to adopt either the notification
rule of McOmnber or the more stringent New York rule prohibiting
any counselless waiver?
The Effectiveness of the Miranda Warning
The post-Miranda presumption is that the mere reading of the
right to counsel ensures a voluntary and knowing waiver. This
presumption is unrealistic. The most important weakness of the
prevailing view is its overestimation of the capacity of the typical
suspect. The 1970 study established that many children do not
understand even a simplified version of the Miranda warnings. 100
97. State v. Loyd, 297 Minn. 442, 212 N.W.2d 671 (1973). See also State
v. Gullings, 244 Or. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966), permitting waiver whenever
the situation is clear to the juvenile.
98. Jarrett v. Wyoming, 500 P.2d 1027 (Wyo. 1972).
99. See note 79 supra.
100. In re Roderick P., 7 Cal. 3d 801, 500 P.2d 1, 103 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1972).
101. Id.
102. State v. Falbo, 333 S.W.2d 279 (Mo. 1960).
103. E.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); In re ADR, 515 S.W.
2d 438 (Mo. 1974).
104. See text accompanying notes 40-89 supra.
105. See text accompanying notes 123-31 infra.
106. See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra.
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Other studies indicate that many adult suspects fail to comprehend
the Miranda warnings. 07 This finding is true of supposedly sophis-
ticated graduate students as well as illiterate first-time offenders. 08
The intellectual capacity to understand is different from actual
understanding in a particular situation, especially in the intimida-
ting circumstances of custodial interrogation. 0 9 Even supplementing
the Miranda warnings with questions relating to the suspect's un-
derstanding of his rights is ineffective. The suspect may not under-
stand enough to recognize a misunderstanding.
The underlying assumption of the civilian voluntariness decisions
has been that if a suspect can voluntarily waive the right to counsel
at the outset of the proceedings, he is competent to waive the
presence of the attorney at a later time.1"0 Some courts reason
that any suspect knowledgeable enough to assert a right is knowl-
edgeable enough to waive the right."' This assumption ignores
the suspect's implicit admission of incompetence to handle his own
case when he first asserts the right to counsel."12 The request for
counsel casts suspicion on a subsequent waiver. The interrogator
should be required to make an extra showing of voluntariness and
knowingness to combat this suspicion."
3
The waiver has some validity in the case of a hypothetical suspect
subjected to no outside pressures from the police. In reality
107. Interrogation in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J.
1519 (1967).
108. Note, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogations of Draft
Protestors, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967). This study included 21 draft resisters
of whom 7 were faculty members and 11 were graduate or professional
students. Very few of these asserted their Miranda rights, even after formal
warnings; those who did refuse to answer acted on a "hunch," not a know-
ing decision. The article concludes that the Miranda warnings are almost
totally ineffective.
109. United States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d 891, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (dissent-
ing opinion).
110. United States v. Hodge, 487 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1973); Dillon v. United
States, 391 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1968). For similar military reasoning,
see United States v. Estep, 19 C.M.A. 201, 41 C.M.R. 201 (1970); United
States v. Barnhardt, 45 C.M.R. 624 (C.G.C.M. 1972).
111. Biddy v. Diamond, 516 F.2d 118, 122 (5th Cir. 1975).
112. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 110 n.2 (1975) (White, J., concur-
ring) (a decision to make a statement after already asserting a right to
counsel may properly be viewed with skepticism). See also United States
v. Clark, 499 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1974); Moore v. Wolff, 495 F.2d 35, 37
(8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1972);
State v. McConnell, 529 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. App. 1975).
113. United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1352 (7th Cir. 1972).
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the average suspect encounters pressures undermining his will. 114
It is not contended here that the investigator is likely to beat
a confession out of a suspect. However, pressures other than those
physical can affect the human will-the mere fact of custodial in-
terrogation creates considerable pressures. 10 The policeman in the
heat of an investigation is not concerned with a strict preservation
of the suspect's rights for a future trial.110 The average policeman
has neither the legal nor the psychological training to protect the
accused. 117 Even when a suspect manifests misunderstanding, the
policeman rarely stops the interrogation to explain the legal
intricacies of a confession."18 The voluntariness of a suspect's
change of mind is especially unlikely when the police, rather than
the suspect, reinitiate the questioning." 9
Some courts allow resumed interrogation only to check whether
the suspect has changed his mind. 20 The distinction between per-
missible checking and impermissible interrogation is too fine to
withstand the realities of police practice.' 21 The suspect may not
understand the difference and will respond to the increased pres-
sure with an involuntary waiver of the right to the presence of
counsel. In addition, a great temptation exists for the interviewer
to ask one more question or press for one more answer. Other
courts hold, more reasonably, that a subsequent waiver of the right
to counsel is involuntary as a matter of law whenever it results
from acts of the police.
122
114. Miranda v. Arizona, 394 U.S. at 467. The Court concluded that "the
process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspect or accused of crime
contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the in-
dividual's will to resist and to compel him to speak when he would not
otherwise do so freely."
115. Id.
116. Note, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft
Protestors, 77 YALE L.J. 300, 309 (1967).
117. Id. See also United States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Interrogations at New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J.
1519, 1554 (1967).
118. United States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d 891, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (dissent-
ing opinion); Interrogations at New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76
YALE L.J. 1519, 1555, 1569 (1967); Note, A Postscript to the Miranda Project:
Interrogation of Draft Protestors, 77 YALE L.J. 300, 308, 313 (1967).
119. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975); United States v. Clark,
499 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1973); Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371, 374
(9th Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 870 (1968).
120. United States v. Olof, 527 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Jackson, 436 F.2d 39, 41 (9th Cir. 1970).
121. United States v. Olof, 527 F.2d 752, 753 (9th Cir. 1975); United States
ex tel. Chabonian v. Liek, 366 F. Supp. 72, 80 (E.D. Wisc. 1973).
122. United States ex rel. Chabonian v. Liek, 366 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Wisc.
1973); People v. Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948, 464 P.2d 114, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658
(1970).
1220
[VOL. 14: 1205, 1977] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Strengthening the Miranda Warning
The effectiveness of the Miranda warning is slight. The suspect
is not likely to understand the warnings, and even the understand-
ing suspect is often incapable of resisting police questioning. Thus,
the state courts face a choice: Either accept the United States
Supreme Court's return to the voluntariness standard or strengthen
Miranda through the adoption of the McOmber rule as state law.
New York has chosen to entirely exclude counselless waivers.
Predating Miranda, the New York rule originally applied only to
situations in which the police actively prevented the suspect from
consulting his attorney. 123 New York subsequently extended the
rule to cover any counselless waiver. 2 4 Under this rule it is
immaterial that the attorney represents the suspect only informally
or for a different charge. 25 The only requirement is that the police
know of the attorney's involvement. Whenever the interrogators
have this knowledge, the New York courts prohibit any questioning
in the absence of counsel. Because the New York courts deny the
validity of counselless waivers, 28 the issue of notification does not
arise. 27 The New York courts base the per se exclusionary rule
upon state statutory and constitutional grounds, although the
opinions applying the rule often refer to the policies of the sixth
amendment cases-Escobedo,128 Massiah,129 and Miranda.130  Ac-
knowledging the legitimate interests of law enforcement, the New
York courts nevertheless insist that a grant of the right to an attor-
ney be realistic. The New York courts find that consultation with
123. People v. Failla, 14 N.Y.2d 178, 199 N.E.2d 366, 250 N.Y.S.2d 267
(1964); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841
(1963); People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21
(1960).
124. People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924
(1965).
125. People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663
(1968). But see People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384
N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976) (rule may not be applicable if counsel represents the
suspect only on an unrelated charge).
126. See notes 124-25 supra.
127. People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.
2d 663, 666 (1968) (finding no requirement that the attorney request the
police to respect the rights of the suspect).
128. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
129. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
130. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See, e.g., People v. Dono-
van, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
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an attorney supplies the most effective protection against an
involuntary waiver of the right to counsel. 131
Justice White has argued that the New York rule paternalistically
disregards the suspect's own intentions and "imprison [s] him in his
privileges."1 32 It is inconsistent, however, to insist on the "privi-
lege" to make a decision based on an unintelligible recitation of
rights. To say that a suspect is free to make a voluntary and know-
ing waiver without ensuring that he is able to make that decision,
grants only the form, not the substance required by the sixth
amendment.
The argument that the McOmber rule would cripple law enforce-
ment is unsound. The police have adapted to the requirements of
Miranda,33 despite the dire predictions of the Miranda dissenters
that the decision would weaken law enforcement. 134 An additional
requirement of the presence of counsel for a valid waiver may
result in more delays and fewer confessions, perhaps even in fewer
convictions. However, the experiences of New York and the expec-
tations of the military under McOmber'3 5 indicate that such delays
are not overwhelming. The per se exclusionary rule of McOmber
is workable.
CONCLUSION
The Miranda warnings fail in two ways to provide sufficient pro-
131. People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841
(1963); People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 218 N.Y.S.2d 70
(1961). See also the expression of this principle in People v. Hobson, 39
N.Y.2d 479, 483, 348 N.E.2d 894, 898-99, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 423 (1976):
Moreover, the principle is not so much, important as that is, to pre-
serve the civilized decencies, but to protect the individual often
ignorant and uneducated, and always in fear, when faced with the
coercive police power of the State. The right to the continued ad-
vice of a lawyer, already retained or appointed, is his real protec-
tion against an abuse of power by the organized State.
132. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 108-09 (1975) (White, J., concur-
ring), quoting with approval, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975);
United States v. Davis, 527 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012
(1975).
133. E.g., Interrogations at New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE
L.J. 1519, 1562-65 (1967).
California recognizes a distinction between pre- and post-indictment
police requirements, assuming that once charges have been filed, the need
for investigation decreases. People v. Wong, 18 Cal. 3d 178, 555 P.2d 297,
133 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1976) (no need to notify counsel of pre-indictment inter-
rogation, leaving open the question of post-indictment waiver).
134. 483 U.S. at 516-17 (dissenting opinion).
135. The military courts have found the McOmber rule sufficiently work-
able to subsequently forbid counselless waivers when the attorney repre-
sents a suspect on charges different from the subject of the interrogation.
United States v. Lowry, No. NCM 75-0449 (C.M.A. Nov. 5, 1976).
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tection for the accused. First, the warnings are unintelligible and
ineffective without the advice of counsel. Second, even if the
original Miranda interpretation of the right to counsel did furnish
adequate protection for the accused, the Supreme -Court's increas-
ingly narrow interpretation of Miranda and the right to counsel
endangers this protection.136
This erosion of Miranda has been accompanied by the federal
courts' rejection of the possibilities of using Massiah, McLeod, and
the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility to reinforce the right to
counsel. 37 The Supreme Court's decisions on the right to counsel
have been part of a general retreat from the activism of the Warren
Court under the fourth,"38 fifth,139 and sixth140 amendments. As
136. E.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977); Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96 (1975); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). The rationale and
possible effects of Mosley are discussed in Comment, Michigan v. Mosley:
A Further Erosion of Miranda, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861 (1976).
Miranda narrowly escaped even further limitation in the recent decision
of Williams v. Brewer, 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977). In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court
found an invalid "waiver" of the right to counsel when an accused revealed
the location of a body after police questioning outside the presence of
counsel. However, far from being an acceptance of the necessity for
counsel's presence, the Court specifically noted that the accused could
have waived his right to counsel but did not do so in the particular cir-
cumstances. Not only had the accused previously asserted his right to
counsel and his right to silence, but his counsel also had released him into
police custody for transportation without counsel's presence, only after re-
peated police assurances that there would be no questioning during the trip.
The narrowness of this decision is obvious in the vehement dissent of
Chief Justice Burger, in which he insisted that the "result reached by the
Court in this case ought to be intolerable in any society which purports to
call itself an organized society." Id. at 1248 (dissenting opinion). In addi-
tion, Justice Stevens' concurrence stressed the impropriety of police acts in
ignoring an agreement with counsel. In the absence of such an agreement,
Stevens (and thus the Court) may have reached a different conclusion. It
seems clear that the right to counsel is certain to be limited in any case
with less compelling facts.
137. See text accompanying notes 51-77 supra. But cf. Williams v.
Brewer, 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977). In Williars, the Supreme Court found
Massiah indistinguishable from the case considered there. Id. at 1240.
The Court, however, concluded that the proper test to be applied was not
Massiah or even Miranda, but rather a return to the voluntariness test of
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1939).
138. E.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 418 (1976); Gustafson
v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
139. E.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
140. E.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (statements violating Mir-
anda may be used for impeachment); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
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a result, some state courts have become receptive to Justice
Brennan's call to arms in his dissent to Baxter v. Palmigiano.
141
The Justice accused the Court of insensitivity to criminal rights and
called on state courts and legislatures to "remember that they
remain free to afford protection of our basic liberties as a matter
of state law."
142
State courts are, of course, free to construe state law and consti-
tutions to impose higher standards than are required under federal
law. 43 An exclusionary rule based upon state law is effectively
shielded from the changing attitudes of the United States Supreme
Court. 44 This fact provides an incentive for state courts to adopt
and interpret Miranda as a state law. 45 In adopting the McOmber
rule, the military courts suggest a means whereby state courts can
effectively implement Miranda's policies. The alternative of return-
141. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
142. Id. at 339. See also Justice Brennan's dissent in Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96, 121 (1975), where he comments on the erosion of the Miranda
standard.
State courts have increasingly accepted the challenge of providing crim-
inal rights under state constitutions, statutes, and procedural rules. Califor-
nia, for example, has limited searches incident to an arrest. People v.
Maher, 17 Cal. 3d 196, 550 P.2d 1044, 130 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1976); People v.
Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 539 P.2d 237, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1975); People v.
Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975). See
also People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511, cert. denied, 423 U.S.
878 (1975) (rejecting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)); State v.
Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975) (rejecting Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)).
New Jersey has redefined the right against self-incrimination under state
and common law. Compare State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 358 A.2d 163,
(1976), with Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (limiting protection
under the fifth amendment).
State courts have also provided recourse from limitations on the sixth
amendment right to counsel. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (limit-
ing the right to counsel at pretrial identifications), was rejected specifically
under Michigan law. People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22
(1974). See also Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351
(1974) (redefining Kirby according to state policies).
Impeachment using statements taken in violation of Miranda is pro-
hibited in many jurisdictions. Compare Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971), with People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr.
360 (1976); Butler v. State, 493 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); State v.
Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971); and United States v. Jordan,
20 C.M.A. 614, 44 C.M.R. 44 (1971).
143. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Lego v. Towney, 404 U.S.
477, 489 (1972); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
144. Ohio v. Gallagher, 425 U.S. 257 (1976); California v. Krivda, 409 U.S.
33 (1972). See also Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills
of Rights, 8 Hazv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 271 (1973).
145. Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52, 284 A.2d 700 (1971), cert. dis-
missed, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
1224
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ing to the voluntariness test does not provide adequate protection
for the suspect.146
Allowing waiver outside the presence of counsel violates the
suspect's right to counsel as effectively as actively preventing the
attorney-client contact.147  The United States Court of Military
Appeals has recognized this fact in McOmber by requiring notifica-
tion to counsel. Any other rule fails to provide the suspect with
effective assistance of counsel.
148
Standing alone, the Miranda warnings do not afford a suspect
adequate protection of the right to counsel. A critical juncture in
146. The United States Supreme Court has recently hinted at a return
to this approach. Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977). The Court
found the proper standard to be whether there had been an "intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice
White, in their dissents, also stressed the voluntariness test for a valid
waiver. 97 S. Ct. at 1248 & 1255 (dissenting opinions).
Thus, Williams v. Brewer shows the Court, majority and dissents, accept-
ing something less than the rigid requirements of Miranda, and certainly
less than the additional protection of the McOmber rule. Chief Justice
Burger, in fact, is prepared to abandon the exclusionary rule entirely as
based on personal rights, retaining it only in regard to unreliable evidence
and police deterrence. Id. at 1248 (dissenting opinion).
A third alternative is to forbid all interrogations other than those of an
impartial magistrate. This suggestion was first made in Kauper, Judicial
Examination of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L.
REV. 1224 (1932), and recently revived in Kamisar, Kauper's "Judicial Ex-
amination of the Accused" Forty Years Later-Some Comments on a Re-
markable Article, 73 MIcH. L. REV. 15 (1974). Advocates of this procedure
note the inevitable conflict of interest when investigatory police are simul-
taneously the guardians of the suspect's rights. Chief Judge Bazelon com-
mented that a system that places reliance on police warnings puts "a mouse
under the protective custody of the cat." Letter from Chief Judge Bazelon
to Professor Herbert Wechsler, Nov. 16, 1975, quoted in Kamisar, id., at 25.
Those who feel the McOmber rule would too seriously hamper law en-
forcement might well consider this alternative, which would certainly in-
crease delays in information gathering and probably decrease usable con-
fessions.
147. Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371, 375 (9th Cir.) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 870 (1968).
148. United States v. Lowry, No. NCM 75-0449 (C.M.A. Nov. 5 1976).
Justice Stevens, while a circuit judge, in his dissent to United States v.
Springer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1355 (7th Cir. 1972), regarded counselless inter-
views as "such a departure from 'procedural regularity' as to violate the
due process clause of the fifth amendment." In at least that case, Justice
Stevens believed the defendant could not understand the nature of the
constitutional protection he was waiving, and thus could not make a valid
waiver without the active assistance of counsel.
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the history of the Miranda decision has been reached. The states
must either adopt it as state law or lose it. If other state courts
are unwilling to follow the example of New York in excluding any
counselless waiver, they should adopt the rule of McOmber requir-
ing notification to the suspect's attorney.
E. A. SMITH
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